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ABSTRACT 
This paper shows that international  policy coordination is not 
counterproductive in a world where the incentive to run beggar-thy- 
neighbor policies internationally  arises from the inefficiency that 
characterizes,  within each country, the  interaction  between policymakers 
and private agents.  The domestic inefficiency  arises from the presence 
of nominal contracts that give central banks the power to affect real 
variables.  In this setting we show that international cooperation 
belongs to central banks'  dominant strategy.  The  paper is motivated by 
a common  and misleading interpretation  of a paper by Rogoff [1985], 
namely that international  cooperation  may be counterproductive in the 
presence of a domestic inefficiency. 
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There are two well known results in game theory,  relating to the 
optimality of cooperative  strategies.  The  first  stetes that  when all 
players cooperate,  their welfare is higher  than in the absence of 
cooperation. The seco  states that when only some players in a game 
cooperate, all  players  may be worse off  than in a situation  where nobody 
cooperates.  When considered  from the viewpoint of international policy 
coordination, the  latter result suggests that  cooperation  among the 
monetary authorities  of different countries  may be suboptimal if 
cooperation  cannot  be extended to the game that takes  place within each 
country between the  authorities  and private agents (see Rogoff [1985]). 
This paper questions the above intuition by making the simple point that 
in a one-stage game with three players,  in which one player  must move 
before the  others,  cooperation  among the remaining two  is still  their 
dominant strategy,  even when the player  who moves first  fails to 
cooperate. 
The sequential  character of the game is not  crucial for the result: 
it may occurr  even when the  three players decide simultaneously. 
However, sequential  games are important  because the  interaction  between 
policymakers and private agents is often cast in a sequential framework. 
Consider for example the result,  due to Barro and Gordon [1983],  that 
policymakers  incentive to move output away from the natural rate may 
produce an inefficient  outcome: this can only occur  if policymakers have 
not only the  incentive,  but also the power to affect real variables.  To 
explain why they should  have such a power, one has to appeal to nominal 2 
contracts.1  The existence  of contracts  makes the game sequential. 
Consider now a two—country  world with nominal wage contracts: once wages 
are  set  in each country, the  two central banks can decide  whether to 
form a coalition or not  to cooperate.  Since there are only two players, 
cooperation  is unambiguously superior.  Thus,  at the time when contracts 
are signed,  wage—setters will anticipate not only the power and the 
incentive that central banks have to affect real wages ex-post, but also 
their Incentive to cooperate internationally.  International  cooperation 
thus  belongs to the  (unique)  subgame perfect equilibrium  outcome of the 
game.  We prove this result in section 3. 
This paper is motivated by a common and misleading interpretation 
of a paper by Rogoff [1985],  namely that  international cooperation  may 
be counterproductive in the presence of a domestic inefficiency.  Rogoff 
computes an outcome in which central banks cooperate, and wage—setters 
expect them to cooperate,  and one  in which central banks  do not 
cooperate and are expected not  to cooperate.  Comparing the two outcomes 
is misleading, because the case where central banks do not cooperate is 
not a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of the  sequential  game.  The 
appropriate  comparisons must be restricted to equilibrium  outcomes. 
It remains true,  however, that  the cooperative outcome,  although an 
equilibrium, may not be optimal——in the  sense  that it may be Pareto— 
dominated by the non-cooperative outcome.  This remark would seem to 
provide an argument in favor of designing "institutions"  that make 
countries' commitment  not to cooperate credible—-for example cancelling 
1  If the power to affect real  variables  were due to information 
asymmetries, the optimal policy  would consist in making information 
freely available.  See Fischer [1986]. routine OECD or G-n meetings.  The argument is similar to the view that, 
in a closed economy, central banks'  discretion should be restricted  by 
law.  We discuss this issue in section  '4.  There we show that preventing 
international cooperation  may be suboptimal  in a world subject to 
stochastic shocks. 
We conclude that one  has  to look for  explanations  other  than 
nominal contracts to argue that international cooperation  may be 
counterproductive.  One  possible  direction is asymmetric  information, as 
in Bean [19861.2  Another is to raise the number  of players——for example 
considering  the presence of a fiscal  and a monetary authority  within 
each country, or increasing the number  of countries. 
2.  Monetary Policy Interactions  in a Two—Country World 
The basic  structure of our example is a two-country  model with six 
decision-makers:  a representative  firm,  a union, and a  central  banker in 
each of the  two  countries.  This model has been used by Canzoneri and 
Henderson [19881  and, in a different framework,  by Giavazzi and 
Giovannini [1988a];  it is similar to that analyzed by Rogoff [19851——in 
fact it has the same reduced  form.  The model is laid out  in Table  1 
Lower case letters indicate variables expressed in logs and in 
deviations  from equilibrium. Upper case letters indicate the level of 
the  same variables.  The two countries are  symmetric,  and in each 
countr: tomestic  labor is the  only factor of production.  The  technology 
2 This explanation, however, is open to the same criticism that applies 
to motivations of the time-consistency  problem based on information 
asymmetries, rather than  on the  assumed existence of nominal 
contracts. See the previous footnote. is Cobb—Douglas with decreasing returns. 
Table 1: The Model 
(1)  y  = (1—a)n  — x 
(1') 
* =  (1o)n  - x 
*  * 
(2)  y — y  = 5(e  + p  — p) 
(3)  m-py 
*  *  *  (3')  m  — p  = 
*  (4)  qp+8(e+p  -p) 
*  *  a 
(4')  q  p  +fl(p—e—p) 
(5) 
S.i 
=  PY  —  WN 
a  **  **  (5')  VF=PY —WN 
(6)  V 
= 
(6')  V  =  —(n  r 
=  - o(n- k)2- (q)2 
(7')  V=o(n —k)—(q 
(1) and  (1  )  are output supply equations: (the  log of)  output in 
the domestic and foreign (*3 country is an increasing  function of (the 
log of)  employment,  and a decreasing function of a productivity 
disturbance,  x.  Domestic and foreign output are  imperfect substitutes. 
*  Relative prices, the (log  of the) level of the real exchange rate,  e+p - 
p,  decermine the allocation of world demand:  this is equation (2). 
Domestic and foreign money are the only assets,  and are non—traded: 
money demand (equations  (3)  and (3'))  is simply  a function of the  level 
of income. 
Equations (5),  and (5'),  (6),  and  (6'),  (7),  and (7')  describe the 5 
objectives  of the  players in each country.  Firms maximize one period 
profits,  and unions aim at stabilizing  employment  around its natural 
rate,  (n=n*=O).3  Central banks have two objectives: they  minimize the 
fluctuations  of the domestic CPI  (defined  in equations (4) and  (4')) 
and of the deviation of domestic employment  from a  target,  k,  that 
exceeds the natural rate.  This assumes  that the natural rate of output 
lies within the  s production  possibility  frontier, for  example 
because of the presence of distortions  or externalities.  The 
inefficiency  of the natural rate of output is the motivation of the game 
that  takes  place between the union  and the central bank inside each 
country, and among central bankers  internationally.  If the natural 
rates  of output were socially optimal,  central bankers would have no 
incentive to affect real variables,  and both games  would vanish. 
The "rules of the game" are as follows. 
1)  The game is sequential.  tn period 0 unions set nominal wages for 
period 1.  When period 
1  comes,  firms choose output and employment,  and 
central bankers set the money stock.  The  existence of nominal contracts 
gives  central  bankers the power to affect real variables ex-post.  The 
realization  of the productivity shock is known to firms  and central 
hankers before they make their decisions,  but is unknown to unions: the 
expectation  of x when unions set wages is equal to 0. Hence, unions 
maximize the  expected value of equations (6) and (6'):  wages are set  in 
period  0 based on the  expectation  of the price level that will prevail 
in period 1.  With rational expectations,  unions anticipate that 
The main point of the paper remains  valid if unions also care about 
fluctuations of the domestic CPI. equilibrium  prices in period 1  whi be the  outcome of the game involving 
the domestic and the foreign central  bank. 
2) Firms  are passive players in the game:  given wages and  the 
realization  of the productivity  shock,  firms compute their profit— 
maximizing  demand of labor  taking  monetary policy (that is the price 
level)  as given.  This is equivalent to assuming an infinite number  of 
competitive  firms  in each country, whose aggregate strategy consists in 
4 
maximizing (5) and (5  ).  From  (1) and  (1  ),  we  have: 
(8)  n  =  —(1/s)(w—p)  — x/s 
*  *  *  (8  )  n  = —(1/a)(w  —p )  — xis 
3) Central bankers set the money stock given the domestic nominal wage 
and the  reaction function of domestic firms.  The equilibrium  of the 
international game between the two cenfrel banks can be cooperative  or 
non cooperative.  We define cooperation  as the  outcome of a Nash 
bargaining  process assuming that central banks  can committ themselves to 
the cooperative strategy, 
The above "rules  of the game" simplify  the structure of the problem 
by restricting  the number of strategic  interactions among the players in 
the game to only two:  one between the union and the central bank in each 
country, and one between the central banks of the two countries.  We 
rule out other possible interactions  since  they would make the 
equilibrium too difficult to compute analytically.  Notice,  for example, 
This assumption implies that all outcomes of the game must belong to 
the firms'  reaction functions, 7 
that  firms  do not use foreign output  as a factor  of production; given 
wages,  employment  only depends on the domestic price  level,  so that 
unions  do not have to take into account  what happens abroad. 
To provide  a simple  and stronger  proof of our main result  we 
proceed as follows.  ie start  from a non stochastic  world with no 
productivity  shocks.  Later  we allow for stochastic  productivity 
shocks. 
3.  Optimal  Monerv  Policies and International  Cooperation 
3.a A non-atochastic  world 
In period 0,  when they set wages, unions ignore the policy regime 
that will prevail in period 1  . It is straightforward  to show that 
maximization of the  unions  expected payoffs implies the following  wage— 
setting rules: 
e  *  *e  (9)  w=p  w 
The wage is equal  to the expected price  level.  This expectation  is 
computed anticipating the international  policy regime that will prevail 
in period 1.  Given wages, central banks  will decide whether to 
cooperate  or not to cooperate  and will choose  the  optimal level of the 
money stock accordingly.  The anticipation  of this choice determines the 
Rogoff [1985]  shows  that in the absence of real shocks,  international 
cooperation is unambiguously counterproductive.  The comparison  between the two regimes becomes ambiguous in the presence of real 
disturbances. 8 
expectation  of the price level that will prevail in period 
1  .  We 
restrict our analysis subgame  perfect  equilibria: this means that in 
equilibrium  central bankers' incentive to achieve nk, n*k by fooling 
the unions is perfectly anticipated. We compute the  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium  of the one-stage  game in the following way.  We first 
determine the optimal strategy of central banks in period 1;  then we 
compute the optimal strategy of unions  in period 0 under the assumption 
that  central  banks'  behaviour in period 1  is perfectly  anticipated. 
In period 1 ,  central banks maximize their payoff functions under 
the following constraints: 
Reduced Form in Period 1  (x=0) 
(10)  n  m—w 
*  *  *  (10)  n  am -w 
(11)  q  = mm  + (1-a)w + 8[(m_m*)  - (ww)] 
*  *  *  *  * 
(11  )  q  = am  + (1—a)w  + 8[(m —m) —  (w  —w)] 
S  = 
where w and w* are the wage rates  set by unions in period 0. 
6 
Central banks cen either  cooperete or not cooperate.  Consider 
6 In principle the  international  monetary system could also work 
asymmetrically,  with one country controlling the money stock,  while 
the other controls the exchange rate.  We could thus have four 
regimes: cooperation  and non cooperation, under flexible and managed 
rates.  The relevant regimes,  however, are only two.  This is because 
when central banks cooperate,  the exchange rate regime is irrelevant; 
when they do not cooperate,  managed rate are unstable.  In one  case 
the explanation is that the cooperative  solution is computed 
maximizing a single  objective+function  by choosing two out of three 
possible instruments Ce, m, m ), that are linearly dependent.  The 
instability  of a non cooperative  regime of managed exchange rates  is 9 
first  the case of non cooperation.  Each central bank sets the money 
stock taking the partners  money stock as given.  Therefore, each 
central hank believes that a change in its money stock can affect the 
exchange rate.  Because the exchange rate feeds back into domestic 
prices, each central :ank believes that monetary policy can improve the 
output—price level  trade off.  For any given level of wages, the non 
cooperative  equilibrium  in period I  is: 
(12)  n  = 
(12)  n* = 
(13)  q  = 
(13)  q5=o(ak+w5)I[o+e(e+e)] 
which implies  the following payoffs': 
(14) 
— (a(mk+w)/(a+x(+8))]2 
(14)  V*B 
= - r[(ak_(a+8)w*)/(o+m(e+8))_k12 - 
—  [o(xk+w*)/(a+,x(a+8))12  v*OB 
where  the superscript  o denotes the non cooperative  outcome. 
discussed in Giavazzi and Giovannini [1988b]. 
/ I  equations (14)  and  (14'),  we denote  with the  same symbol,  V  and 
V 
,  the  payoff functions and their  value at maximum. We do ths 
thPoughout  the paper to keep the notation simple,  since it never gives 
rise to ambiguity. 10 
If instead the two central banks  agree to cooperate  and to form a 
coalition, they will determine their  optimal policy by maximizing a 
joint  objective function.  We define the cooperative  equilibrium  as the 
outcome of a Nash bargaining problem,  and we compute  it by maximizing 
the  product of the gains from agreement:8 
*  0  *  *  *  *0  (15) 
:::B(mm 
,w,k)—V  8)][V 8(m ,m,w ,kY-V 
where V°8 and V°8, defined in equations (14)  and (14'), are the payoffs 
in the absence of international  cooperation.  Because the two  countries 
are symmetric, the  solution  of this problem is such that m = m*,  and is 
thus  easy to compute.  For any given level of wages, the cooperative 
equilibrium  in period 1  is: 
(16)  n  = (ok-aw)/(o+m2) 
(16')  n*  (ok_mw*)/(o+a) 
(17)  q  = 
(17)  q* = o(rxk+w*)/(o+e2) 
The Nash bargaining solution has recently been discussed  and clarified 
by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinski [1986],  Rochet [1986].  An 
application to an international  policy game is contained in Bean 
[1986].  We compute the cooperative  equilibrium  assuming that central 
banks can sign binding agreements to cooperate.  No cooperative 
agreement could instead he signed  between the union and  the central 
bank within each country, because central banks and unions  make their 
decision at different times.  Cooperative  agreements  would also be 
impossible if we assumed that the union were a fictitious  agent whose 
strategy derives from aggregating the strategies of an infinite number 
of atomistic agents.  Carraro [1985,  1988]  discusses the implications  of the  sequential  character of the one—stage game when the game is 
repeated. 11 
which implies the following payoffs: 
(18)  VB 
=  [(-)/(o2)-k]2-[a(+w)1(o+m2)]2 
*  *  *  2  *c 
(18')  V8= —o[(o-aw )/(o+cx')—k]—[a(mk+w  )/(a+a)]  V 
where the superscript  c denotes the cooperative  outcome. 
c  o  *c  *0  The  comparison of V 
B 
and V B  (V  B and V 
B respectively) proves 
the following result: 
Proposition 1:  Each central  bank achieves a larger  payoff in the 
presence of international cooperation, whatever the wage set by the 
domestic union in period 0. 
Proof:  It is possible to write: 
2  2  2  o +a(m+8)  ocx  +0 
(19)  VCB_ V°B 
= (w+ak)2  [ 
2 
- 
2  (a+cx(cx+8))  (o+cx  ) 
where the term in square brackets can easily be shown to be positive. 
Hence,  VCB 
> 
V°B  whatever  w,  In the  same way,  it is possible to show 
that v*CB 
>  v*0B whatever  wi'.  International  cooperation is the central 
banks  dominant strategy in period 1,  independently  of the wage set by 
unions in period 0.  Thus cooperation is the only subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the  game.  To compute this equilibrium  we must turn to 
the behavior of unions in period 0.  Before doing so we note that 
international cooperation  implies the following values for the two money 
stocks: 12 
(20)  m = (ok-aw)/(o+cx2)  + w 
*  *  0  *  (20)  m  = (ok—aw )/(a+a)  + w 
In  period 0 unions set wages maximizing (6) and (6) subject to the 
following constraints: 
Reduced Form in Period 0 (nO) 
e  (21)  n  m — a 
*  *  *e 
(21')  n  = m  —  m 
(22)  e  = [1_a(1_6)J(m_m*)/8  - 
(23)  q  a5 + a(m_me)  + 
(23')  q* = m*e  + a(m*_m*e)  + 
where m and m* are defined in (20)  and  (20'),  The optimal wage is: 
(24)  w=wt  =ak/a 
Substituting equation (24)  in equations (18) yields the subgame perfect 
equilibrium  of the sequential  game,  and the central banks' payoffs that 
are, respectively: 
(25)  n = n*  = 0 
(26)  q = q*  = akja 
(27)  V8  V8  —ak2 —(ak/a)2 13 
The result that  the equilibrium  where the two ceotral banks 
cooperate is the only aubgame perfect equilibrium  of the sequential game 
can also be shown in the following  way.  Let the unions  choose between 
and w0 in period  0, where wc is the wage when unions expect 
international cooperation  in period 1  ,  and  w0 is  the  wage  when  they 
expect  that  central  banks  will  not  cooperate.  Let mc and m0 denote the 
central banks  strategy in the  presence and  absence of international 
cooperation respectively.  The game can be described by the  following 
decision tree: 
The  Extensive Eorm of the Game (x0) 
Union 
/\ 
w'f  \w° 
/  \ 
C.Bank  C.Bank 
c  0  c  0  m/  \m  m/  \m 
/  \  /  \ 
2,1  1,0  4,0  3,1 
where  the numbers indicate the  ranking assigned to the different payoffs 
by the central bank and the  union respectively.  As previously shown,  mc 
is a dominant strategy for the  central bank whatever w.  Anticipating 
this outcome, the union  maximizes its payoff  setting the wage equal to 
wc.  The sequence (wc,  mc)  is the only subgame perfect euilibrium. 
Notice that  the  sequence (w°,m°)  would yield the following outcome: 14 
(28)  n = n*  = 0 
(29)  q  = q*  = ok/(m+8) 
(30)  V8 
= Vt8  -ak2 - (ak/(cx+8fl2 
The sequence (w0m0)  Pareto-dominates  the sequence (wc,mc).  However, 
the outcome (28)—(29)  is not a subgame perfect equilibrium  and can only 
he achieved if central  banks  can  sign in period  0 a binding agreement 
not to cooperate.  If this were possible,  however, central banks could 
commit themselves  to even better strategies.  In particular,  they  could 
achieve the Pareto  optimum by precommitting to set mm*0.9 
The sequential  character of the game is not  crucial  for the result 
that  cooperation  belongs to central banks' dominant strategy.  The 
same result holds when the four players decide simultaneously,  and the 
two central banks  set the money stock taking nominal  wages as given. 
In the specific model used in this  paper,  the subgame perfect 
equilibrium  of the sequential game and the Nash equilibrium  of the 
game in which all  players decide  simultaneously coincide.  This is due 
to the particular form of the unions'  loss function.  If we modify 
this loss function (for  instance including  the domestic CPI  among the 
unions'  targets),  the  two equilibria  would not coincide,  sltough it 
would still be true that cooperation  belongs to central  banks' 
dominsnt strategy. 15 
3.b A stochastic  world 
We now compute the  subgame perfect equilibrium  of the  international 
policy  game allowing for  stochastic  real shocks.  In the presence of a 
common productivity  shock,  x,  in the  two countries, the reduced form of 
the model in period 1  is: 
Reduced Form in Period 1  Cx - 0) 
(31)  n  = m  — w 
*  *  *  (31)  n  =m —w 
(32)  q  = cm + (1—m)w  + x  + 8[(m_m*)  — (w_w*)] 
(32)  q* = mm*  + (1_s)w* + x  ÷  8[(m*_m)  - (w*_w)] 
Central  bankers maximize their  payoff function given  domestic wages 
and the  above  constraints.  We consider again two regimes: cooperation 
and non cooperation.  In the case of non cooperation,  the outcome of the 
game and  the payoffs of central banks are  respectively: 
(33)  n  = [ak-(m+8)(w+x)J/[a+m(m+8)) 
(33')  n*  = [ak_(m+8)(w*+x)]/[o+m(m+S)] 
(34)  q  = o[mk+w+x]f[a+a(m+6)] 
(34!)  q* = o[mk+w*+x]/[a+m(m+e)] 
(35)  V8 
= -a[(m+8)(w+x)+u(m+R)k]2/[o+m(m+8)12 
V°8 
(35')  V8 
= _o[(m+8)Cw*+x)+a(a+8)k]2/[o+u(m+e)]2 
_a2[mk÷w*÷x]2/[a÷m(m÷8n2 If the two central banks  decide to cooperate and form a coalition, 
the Nash bargaining  outcome and  the central  banks'  payoffs are instead: 
(36)  n  [ok-s(w+x)]/[o+cx2] 
(36')  n* = [ok_e(w*+x)]/[o+m2] 
(37)  q = o[mk+w+x]/[o+a2] 
(37')  q* = o[mk+w*+x]/[o+m2] 
9  2  2 
(38)  VB 




(38!)  VB 
= _o[a2k+r(w*+x)]2/(o+m2)2 
—o [ek+w  +x]  /(a+a r  a 
B 
The comparison of the central  banks' payoffs in the two  regimes 
proves the following result: 
Proposition  2:  Each central bank achieves a larger payoff in the 
presence of international cooperation,  whatever the wage set by the 
domestic union in period zero,  and whatever the productivity shock 
occurring  in period  1. 
Proof:  The inequality 
2  2  22  o +o(m+8)  00 +0 
(39)  VcB_VOB  (w+x+ak)2[ ___________ -  _______  I  >  0 
(o+m(m+B))2  (0+02)2 
is always satisfied because the  term  in square brackets is always 
*c  *0  *  positive.  Simmetrically,  we have V  B_V  B 
> 0,  whatever w  and x. 17 
Proposition  2 shows that international  cooperation  is the only subgame 
perfect equilibrium  of the game even in the  presence of real 
disturbances.  We compute this  equilibrium  proceeding  as in the previous 
section.  The money stocks in period  are: 
(40)  m  = (ok-a(x+wfl/(a+2)  + w 
*  *  2  * 
(40  )  m  (ak-e(x+w ))/(o+e  )  + w 
In period 0, the unions  maximizes the expected value of (6) and  (6') 
subject  to; 
Reduced Form in Period  0 (x  0) 
(41)  n 
*  *  *e 
(41)  n  m  —m 
(42)  e  = [1_a(1_)}(m_m*)/_  [(l_e)(l_&)](me_m*e)/6 
e  *  e  *e 
(+3)  q  = me  +  x(m—m  )  + x  +  B[(m—m  )—(m  —m  )j 
*  *e  *  *e  *  *e  e 
(+3  )  q  = m  + (m  -m  )  + x  + 9[(m —m)-(m  —m )] 
where m and m* are defined in (40)  and (40').  Recalling that the 
expected value of x, as of period 0,  is zero,  we have: 
(44)  w  w  ak/a 
The outcome of the  sequential  game and the central  banks'  payoffs 
are therefore: 
*  2 
(45)  n  =  n  = -axf(a+m 18 




= —o[k + ux/(a+a2)]2  — 
—  [ak/cr  + ox/(a+a2)]2  VCC8 
For example,  following  a positive realization of x (i.e.  when output is 
negatively  affected by the productivity  shock),  employment falls and the 
CPI rises. 
Notice however  that,  contrary to the deterministic case,  even if 
central  banks  could  precommitt not to cooperate,  the resulting 
equilibrium  would no longer be unambiguously superior to the cooperative 
outcome (45)-(46).  If,  in period  0, central banks committ themselves 
not  to cooperate,  the equilibrium  outcome of the game and the central 
banks'  payofs  are respectively: 
(48)  n = n*  = —  (cr+8)x/[o+o(a+B)] 





=  -o[k  + (cr+8)xf(o+u(a+e))]2 — 
-  [ak/(cr+8) +  ax/(o+cr(cx+8))]2  V°°8 
(51) 
Vu 
= V*u  = -a2x2/[a+cr(cr+8)]2  a 
V°°u 
It is easy to show that employment is higher when unions expect 
central banks  to cooperate,  and central banks indeed  cooperate, than in 19 
the  case where unions expect central banks not  to cooperate,  and they do 
not  cooperate.  In contrast,  the CPI  is lower in this latter  case.  The 
welfare comparison  therefore  depends on central banks  preferences. 
Some algebra shows that VCC8 
> OO  iff: 
(52)  xe[2(n+a2)(o+s(+e))ak - xome(m+efl/A  +  B < 0 
where A  e(o+s2)(a+8)[o+c(e+e)]2,  and B  2k2B(2m+8)/m2(m+8). 
The non cooperative  outcome is unambiguously superior to the cooperative 
outcome only if the productivity shock is contained in an interval that 
10 
lies in a neighborhood of x=0. 
For x relatively large,  the extensive form of the game can be 
written as: 
The  Extensive Form of the  game (x  large) 
Union 
c  0  w I  \w 
I  \ 
C.Bank  C.Bank 
/\  /\ 
mC/  \m°  m'/  \m0 
I  \  /  \ 
3,3  1,0  4,2  2,1 
mc is still  the central banks  dominant strategy and (W,fflc)  is the only 
subgame perfect equilibrium  of the game.  Furthermore, the sequence 
10 (52)  a quadratic inequality  in x:  denote by ri  and  r2 the two roots 
of the associated equaion,  where ri can be shown to be positive and 
r2 negative.  V  < V0  only if the productivity shock is contained 
in the  interval r1,r2) that lies in a neighborhood of x0. 20 
(wC,mC) dominates the sequence (w°,m°),  which is not an equilibrium.11 
4. Concluding  remarks 
The paper has studied international  policy  coordination in a world 
where the  incentive  to run beggar—thy—neighbor  policies arises from the 
inefficiency  that characterizes,  within each country, the interaction 
between wage—setters  and  the  central  hank.  We have shown  that if 
central banks can decide, period by period, and after having observed 
wages and real shocks,  whether or not to form international  coalitions, 
the only subgame perfect equilibrium  is the cooperative  equilibrium. 
However, if real shocks  are "small",  the equilibrium  outcome is 
dominated by the outcome that would obtain if central banks could 
precommitt  not to form coalitions.  If one wished to interpret  this 
result as suggestive  of whether central banks  should  be prevented from 
forming international  coalitions,  the  choice  would depend on the 
variance of real  shocks,  relative to the  inefficiency  associated with 
central  banks'  incentive to affect  real variables es—post.  The 
condition  is: 
(53)  var(x) <  (o)k2 
As in the deterministic case,  the result that cooperation is the 
dominant strategy in the second  stage of the game is robust  with 
respect to different specifications  of unions' loss functions, and 
holds even when the players decide simultaneously.  In the latter 
case,  however,  the presence of a stochastic  shock would be 
irrelevant.  The assumption that unions  do not observe the shock 
makes the presence of stochastic  disturbances relevant and justifies 
the sequential  structure of the game. 21 
where: 
the  smaller is the incentive to be 'time—inconsistent——i.e. the larger 
are k and  a——the smaller is the range of shocks for which a 
precommitment  not  to cooperate is optimal.  If the probability of large 
real shocks is high,  restricting  central  banks from forming 
international  coalitions would yield Pareto-inferior  outc.unes.  But even 
if such probability  were sufficiently  small,  the optimal rule would not 
prevent central banks from forming international  coalitions,  but would 
restrict their ability to create surprise inflation.  The bottom line is 
that international  cooperation is either  unavoidable, because it is the 
only suhgame perfect equilibrium  in the  absence of precommitment,  or 
irrelevant,  because the "optimal" precommitment  eliminates the need for 
international  cooperation. 
We conclude that one has  to look for explanations  other than 
nominal contracts to argue that international  policy coordination  may be 
counterproductive.  One direction is to increase the number of players 
in the game.  Suppose that two authorities coexist in each country: a 
fiscal and a monetary authority.  If fiscal  and monetary policy 
decisions are  simultaneous,  non cooperation  between the  two domestic 
authorities  may render international cooperation  among central bankers 
counterproductive.  This would not be true  if fiscal  policy, like 
nominal wages, were set before monetary policy.  The same  argument would 
hold if we dropped the assumption of competitive  firms.  In 97 
oligopolistic markets firms can form coalitions that may be threatened 
by other players in the game.  Finally,  international cooperation  may be 
counterproductive  in a world with many countries of similar size if only 
a subset of countries agrees to cooperate. In all  these cases the 
general result  stated in the  Introduction  can be applied: the outcome of 
a game when only a subset of players  cooperate  may be dominated by the 
non cooperative  outcome. 23 
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